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Abstract—We introduce complementary information set codes
of higher-order. A binary linear code of length tk and dimension
k is called a complementary information set code of order t (t-
CIS code for short) if it has t pairwise disjoint information sets.
The duals of such codes permit to reduce the cost of masking
cryptographic algorithms against side-channel attacks. As in the
case of codes for error correction, given the length and the
dimension of a t-CIS code, we look for the highest possible
minimum distance. In this paper, this new class of codes is
investigated. The existence of good long CIS codes of order 3 is
derived by a counting argument. General constructions based on
cyclic and quasi-cyclic codes and on the building up construction
are given. A formula similar to a mass formula is given. A
classification of 3-CIS codes of length ≤ 12 is given. Nonlinear
codes better than linear codes are derived by taking binary
images of Z4-codes. A general algorithm based on Edmonds’
basis packing algorithm from matroid theory is developed with
the following property: given a binary linear code of rate 1/t
it either provides t disjoint information sets or proves that the
code is not t-CIS. Using this algorithm, all optimal or best known
[tk, k] codes where t = 3, 4, . . . , 256 and 1 ≤ k ≤ b256/tc are
shown to be t-CIS for all such k and t, except for t = 3 with
k = 44 and t = 4 with k = 37.
Keywords: dual distance, Boolean functions, Z4-linear
codes, quasi-cyclic codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent paper [3] was introduced the notion of com-
plementary information set codes (CIS codes for short),
that is, binary linear codes of rate one half that admit a pair
of complementary information sets. In the present work we
consider binary codes of rate 1/t that admit t pairwise disjoint
information sets, where t ≥ 2. These we call complementary
information set codes of order t (t-CIS codes for short). Like
for [3] the motivation (developed below) comes from security
of embedded cryptographic hardware; in particular from the
approach of leakage squeezing to counter side-channel attacks
by Boolean masking of cryptographic computations.
A. Connection with the state-of-the-art, and new contributions
There are two main differences between the present work
and the paper [3]. First, there is no analogue of self-dual codes
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for t > 2. In particular, we have defined t-CIS codes as codes
of rate 1/t (whose minimum distance is required to be as large
as possible) for the sake of simplicity. From the viewpoint of
applications, however, a definition in terms of rate (1 − 1/t)
codes of large dual distance might have been more natural (see
Sections II and IV); since all codes considered in this paper
enjoy standard duals (when linear) or formal duals (when Z4-
linear), no difficulty arises. Indeed, all Z4-linear codes have
formal duals [13]. Next, we have found a general algorithm to
test t-CISness, whatever the value of t ≥ 2 is, based on Jack
Edmonds’ base partition algorithm from matroid theory [8]
(note that in [3], there is not such an algorithm to test CISness).
The complexity of this algorithm is polynomial while a naive
algorithm runs in an exponential time (see Sec. VII and [18]).
Thus this algorithm can be efficiently used to determine 2-CIS
codes introduced in [3]. While the paper [8] is self-contained,
the reader can find some more background on matroids in [29],
[35]. For the reader acquainted with this theory, let it suffice to
say that Edmonds’ algorithm is applied to the matroid of linear
dependence defined on the columns of the generator matrix of
the code tested. This algorithm will allow us to show that
there exist optimal or as good as best known t-CIS [tk, k]
codes where t = 3, 4, . . . , 256 and 1 ≤ k ≤ b256/tc except
for t = 3 with k = 44 and t = 4 with k = 37, where 256
is the upper limit on length for the best known binary linear
codes in the Magma database [26] and the Grassl tables [12].
For the common point with [3] one can cite the connection
with vectorial Boolean functions, especially permutations of
Fk2 . Indeed, the existence of t disjoint information sets is
equivalent to the existence of bijections. By the definition
of an information set, each codeword (of length tk) can be
bijectively identified with the vector (say x) of length k equal
to its restriction to some information set i (0 ≤ i < t). Now,
the restriction to the i-th information set (0 ≤ i < t) of the
codeword is the image of x by a bijection, denoted by Gi in
the paper.
Nonlinear permutations better than linear permutations are
constructed in connection with Z4-codes with binary images
better than the best or best known binary linear codes. A
recently discovered Z4-code of parameters (24, 46, 18) is
applied. The asymptotic properties of long 3-CIS codes of
given rate 1/3 are studied. They are shown to satisfy the
Gilbert-Varshamov bound, and this fact cannot be deduced
from known results on self-dual codes like for t = 2.
B. Application to masking schemes
Masking schemes are methods to carry out cryptographic
computations that resist (to some extent) side-channel attacks.
Specifically, each sensitive variable (any intermediate variable
that depends on the input or output and on a secret, e.g.,
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2a key) involved in the cryptographic algorithm is split in t
shares, obtained by randomizing t − 1 vectors, called masks,
of the same length as the sensitive variable, XORing all of
them altogether with the sensitive variable to obtain a t-th
share (this is standard masking) and processing, instead of
the t − 1 masks, their images by bijections (this so-called
leakage squeezing method allows to make the attacks more
difficult). The bijections which encode the masks are denoted
by Fi (0 ≤ i < t) in the paper. A natural question is to
quantify in which respect the proposed bijections improve the
security. The problem is stated in Section II and then solved
in Section IV (using t-CIS codes). When designing a masking
scheme against side-channel attacks, a strategic decision is the
choice for parameter t.
The parameter t determines the number of shares the
attacker shall collect to extract the key. The way the shares
are then combined to build a side-channel distinguisher is dis-
cussed in detail in Sec. II. When t is larger, the countermeasure
is more secure, but it is also more expensive: the cost overhead
varies as t2 in implementations not subject to glitches [32]
and as t3 otherwise (when the countermeasure must explicitly
enforce the glitch-freeness [30]). Implementations with t = 2
are now state-of-the-art in commercial products, and t ≥ 3
are recommended for forward-security applications. Then,
the application of leakage squeezing consists in making the
exploitation of the residual leakage conveyed by the t shares
as chancy as possible. The goal is to increase the order d
of the easiest high-order correlation attack [33], and by the
same token to reduce the mutual information between the
leakage and the sensitive variables [24]. For sound masking
schemes (see e.g., [32]), d ≥ t. Leakage squeezing [23] aims
at optimal values for d (i.e., d  t) through shares encoding
by bijections.
C. Concrete results for masking schemes
A useful case study for embedded systems is when the
sensitive variable Z (to be defined in Sec. II) fits on one
byte. With one mask (t = 2 shares), the leakage squeezing
succeeds to increase the order d of the first successful attack
from 2 (the value of t) to 4 with a [16, 8, 5] code and even to
5 with a (16, 256, 6) code [25]. We recall that the (16, 256, 6)
Nordstrom-Robinson code is the binary image of the (8, 44, 6)
Z4-linear code called the octacode through the Gray map [10];
this motivates further the investigation of Z4-linear codes.
With two masks (t = 3 shares), it is possible to increase the
order d from 3 (the value of t) to 7 with a [24, 8, 8] code.
The gain in terms of security is directly related to the order
d of the attack: the number of observations to successfully
recover the key will increase in proportions of σ2d [34], where
σ2 is the variance of the measurement noise. The overhead,
in terms of cost, is null or negligible (especially in hardware
implementations of masking): it merely consists of calls to
the bijections Fi (0 ≤ i < t). In implementations that make
use of look-up tables (e.g., block ciphers), the bijections can
be merged with the memory that is looked-up, resulting in
no additional cost. For other applications, the cost is that of
evaluating the bijections Fi.
In some cases, linear Fi can be preferred. Indeed, they
provide simultaneously a protection against leakages
• in value, when the leak comes from the values stored in
registers, in the so-called Hamming weight model, and
• in distance, when the leak comes from the differences
between the values stored in registers and the values
stored previously in the same registers, in the so-called
Hamming distance model [2].
Moreover, in general, they might be easier to implement than
non-linear ones. Especially, in the context of high-order mask-
ing [4], the linear operations are often ignored (since faster
than field multiplications) when computing a time complexity.
Eventually, linear bijections allow to relate the t bijections Fi
(0 ≤ i < t) to a t-CIS code (See Section IV-B).
D. Outline of the paper
The material is organized as follows. Section II describes
and discusses the security motivation. Section III collects
the necessary notations and definitions. Section IV develops
the interplay with (vectorial) Boolean functions. Section V
studies Z4-codes. Section VI shows that arbitrarily long t-
CIS codes exist for given t. Section VII describes and runs
the CISness testing algorithm. Section VIII gives numerical
examples of t-CIS codes for t = 3, 4, . . . , 256. Section IX
gives classical construction methods based on respectively,
quasi-cyclic codes and the building up construction of [17],
[3] as well as a formula similar to a mass formula. Section X
gives a classification of 3-CIS codes of length up to 12. Finally,
Section XI concludes the paper with some open problems.
II. MOTIVATION
A. Boolean masking with leakage squeezing
Any embedded system leaks information about the data it
processes and should thus be protected against side-channel
attacks that are able to exploit such a leakage. The attack
targets are “sensitive variables”, i.e., varying data, that depend
on a secret key concealed within the device. Usually, for
implementation reasons, the sensitive variable Z has a size
of k bits, where k is a typical word length of computing
machines, i.e., 4 (nibble), 8 (byte), 16 (word) or 32 (double
word) bits, although some custom circuits can use different
sizes better suited to the algorithm. The variable Z depends
on k bits known by the attacker (e.g., from the input or the
output of the algorithm) and of k bits of a secret key. A usual
situation is when Z is the exclusive-or of a public data and a
part of secret key; like in the AddRoundKey step of the first
round of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES [28]) block
cipher. The attack consists in guessing Z for all 2k possible
choices of the k-bit key part (in the rest of the article, this key
part of k bits is simply called a key), and selecting the key
that maximizes the mutual information between the observed
leakage and the value of Z.
To prevent such attacks, countermeasures are applied. For
instance, high-order masking consists in splitting Z into t > 1
shares Si (0 ≤ i < t), in such a way:
• Z is a deterministic function of all the Si, but
3• Z ⊥⊥ (Si)i∈I if |I| < t (where ⊥⊥ means “statistically
independent”).
A high-order masking scheme that satisfies these properties
for every possible sensitive variable Z is qualified sound.
A convenient and widely studied high-order masking is the
additive Boolean Masking [33], where the sharing is done in
the group (Fk2 ,⊕); the random shares Si are drawn uniformly
in Fk2 while satisfying the constraint Z =
⊕t−1
i=0 Si. Notice that
the high-order masking scheme of Schramm and Paar [33] is
sound only at order 2 [6]. Recently, Rivain and Prouff [32]
(2010) and Coron [5] (2014) have given constructions for
sound high-order masking schemes at any order.
Such high-order masking [32] leaks no information about Z,
hence protects unconditionally the secret keys, when strictly
less than t shares are exploited simultaneously. Recently, it
has been warned that this condition holds only if the scheme
is implemented properly, e.g., without unintended interactions
between the shares. For instance, conditional glitches (spuri-
ous transitions occurring in hardware circuits) can constitute
unintended interactions [27]. But in reaction, masking schemes
have been upgraded [30] to face this risk also.
The leakage squeezing [23] aims at reducing as much as
possible the leakage when the attacker is able to gather the
t shares. It introduces an encoding of the shares that allows
to decorrelate them as much as possible. The goal is to make
high-order attacks difficult. Notice that leakage squeezing can
apply to any high-order masking schemes; for the sake of
clarity, we focus in this paper on leakage squeezing on additive
Boolean masking.
Their formalization requires the introduction of the notion
of leakage function Li (0 ≤ i < t). In the optimal case for
the attacker, each share Si is leaked independently through
Li : Fk2 → R. The leakage function Li can be written as the
composition:
Li(Si) =
attacker’s
function ◦
device’s
function ◦
defender’s
function (Si) .
Typical examples are:
• Defender’s function: a function Fi : Fk2 → Fk2 , which
must be bijective, since at the end of the computation
one must recover the shares Si from their image by Fi;
• Device’s function: it is mapping `i from Fk2 to R that
represents the transduction from “bits” to the “side-
channel physical quantity” (e.g., Volts if a voltage is
measured, or Amperes if a current is measured, etc.).
From a mathematical perspective, it is a pseudo-Boolean
function of unit numerical degree, i.e., an affine function
of the input bits. If efforts are done to balance the
hardware, then `i can be the Hamming weight.
• Attacker’s function: an application Hi : R → R that
raises the leakage’s degree, typically the “power” function
x 7→ xpi , for some pi ≥ 1.
The attacker exploits this leakage by computing the optimal
combination, i.e., the product
∏t−1
i=0 Li(Si) [31]. This com-
bination by product is optimal in the sense that it minimizes
the effect of the noise. The optimality of this combination
function has been conjectured in [31], but we prove it for the
first time in this article. Recently, the same result has been
proved independently by a team from Northeastern University
(Boston, USA) using a different path [7].
Typically the Li(Si) are measured as a random variable
Li(Si) + Ni affected by a centered noise Ni of variance
σ2i . For instance, when pi = 1, it is a customary hy-
pothesis to take Ni ∼ N (0, σ2i ), i.e., an additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN). Any combination of leakage func-
tions can be written, in a general way, as a polynomial in
R[L0(S0), · · · , Lt−1(St−1)]:
∑
~α=(αi)∈Nt β~α
∏t−1
i=0 Li(Si)
αi ,
where the β~α are real coefficients (possibly equal to zero). As
the attacker does not know the shares Si but only their leakages
Li(Si), (s)he simply checks whether there is a dependence, in
average, with Z = z. Now,
E
[∑
~α=(αi)∈Nt β~α
∏t−1
i=0 Li(Si)
αi | Z = z
]
=
∑
~α=(αi)∈Nt β~αE
[∏t−1
i=0 Li(Si)
αi | Z = z
]
(by the linearity of the expectation)
=
∑
~α=(αi)∈(N?)t β~αE
[∏t−1
i=0 Li(Si)
αi | Z = z
]
(by the soundness property of the masking)
This means all the exponents αi in the combination function
must be strictly positive. The smallest effect of the noise
occurs when they are all equal to 1, and the terms of higher
degree simply add more noise, thus shall not be taken into
consideration. Consequently, the optimal combination results
from the choice ∀~α 6= (1, 1, · · · , 1), β~α = 0. By convention,
we set β(1,1,··· ,1) = 1.
The dependence between the optimal combination of the
leakage of the t shares and the sensitive variable Z writes:
E
[∏t−1
i=0 Li(Si) | Z = z
]
= 1
2k(t−1)
∑
s1,··· ,st−1 L0(z ⊕
t−1⊕
i=1
si︸ ︷︷ ︸
=s0
) ·∏t−1i=1 Li(si)
= 2−k(t−1)
⊗t−1
i=0 Li(z),
where ⊗ represents convolution. The attacker can successfully
build a distinguisher between the (only) correct and the (many)
incorrect key hypotheses if and only if this quantity depends on
z. As a corollary, the attack fails if and only if
⊗t−1
i=0 Li(z) is a
constant. Recall that Li is typically written as Li = Hi◦`i◦Fi;
If F0 is linear, so is F−10 , and
⊗t−1
i=0 Li(z) =
⊗t−1
i=0 L
′
i(z
′),
where L′i = Li ◦ F−10 and z′ = F0(z). So
⊗t−1
i=0 Li is a
constant if and only if
⊗t−1
i=0 L
′
i is. This means that F0 can be
chosen equal to the identity Id, which is customarily assumed
in articles about leakage squeezing [23], [24], [25], [1], [2].
We will also make this assumption in the sequel.
Without leakage squeezing, i.e., for all i ∈ {0, · · · , t −
1}, Fi = Id, the convolution product
⊗t−1
i=0 Li(z) depends
on z whatever the values pi are, and in particular also if
they have their smallest possible values pi = 1. Now, as
shown in [24], the attack becomes all the more difficult as∑
i d
◦(Hi) =
∑
i pi, where d
◦(Hi) denotes the degree of
Hi, is high. Logically, this quantity is called the order of the
4attack1. Raising this quantity from t to greater values d, is the
topic of [25] for t = 2 and of [1] for t = 3. In Section 3.3
of [1], it is explained that non-trivial bijections Fi manage to
increase the order of the attack from t to d. The conditions on
the Fi are expressed in Sec. IV. An example (using in advance
the results from Sec. IV and VIII) is completely explicited
below.
In this article, we tackle the general case (arbitrary k and t),
i.e., finding the t bijections Fi : Fk2 → Fk2 that maximize d for
a given pair (k, t). This comes down to achieving the highest
security level for a given overhead. An equivalent problem
would be to fix k and d, and to find the smallest t. This comes
down to minimizing the overhead for a given security level.
B. Example for k = 8 and t = 3
An algorithm such as AES manipulates sensitive variables
Z ∈ Fk2 that are bytes (k = 8). Without care, Z leaks
through various side-channels (e.g., the electromagnetic field)
emitted by the register it resides in. The register is the
hardware resource that memorizes the state of a circuit, e.g.,
of the current state of an iterative block cipher such as the
AES. This is sketched in Fig. 1(a): the register is the grey
box with the tiny triangle on its left side. It means that at
every clock cycle, this register is sampling a new sensitive
variable Z, and consequently leaks some information about Z
(which is symbolized by blue waves). The additive Boolean
countermeasure consists in splitting Z into several shares (here
t = 3) using random numbers (here M1,M2 ∈ Fk2). Thus, the
attacker must collect and combine 3 leakages, as shown in
Fig. 1(b). We have nonetheless that (`0⊗ `1⊗ `2)(z), quantity
proportional to Equation (II-A), depends on z; for instance,
when all `i (0 ≤ i < 3) are the Hamming weight function2
then 2−2k(wH⊗wH⊗wH)(z) = wH(z)/4+(k−1)k(k+1)/8.
Now, the leakage squeezing (with linear bijections) consists
in finding two linear permutations of Fk2 , denoted by F1 and
F2, such that:
• not only (`0 ⊗ (`1 ◦ F1)⊗ (`2 ◦ F2)) (z) does not depend
on z ∈ Fk2 ,
• but also such that (`p00 ⊗ (`1 ◦ F1)p1 ⊗ (`2 ◦ F2)p2) (z)
does not depend on z ∈ Fk2 for all pi ≥ 1 (i ∈ {0, 1, 2})
such as p1 + p2 + p3 ≤ d, for d as large as possible.
The bijections are applied to the shares M1 and M2, as can
be seen from Fig. 1(c).
As proven later in Theorem IV.1, the condition of F1 and
F2 is that they form a Correlation Immune Pair, i.e., that the
code
C(F1, F2) = {(M1 ⊕M2, F1(M1), F2(M2))|M1, M2 ∈ Fk2}
has dual distance at least d+ 1.
1To be more rigorous, we shall consider for the order of the attack the sum
of the algebraic degrees of the pseudo-Boolean functions Hi ◦ `i. However,
it happens to coincide with
∑
i d
◦(Hi) because the `i have unit numerical
degree.
2It is shown in the Equation (6) of [24], located in the proof
of Theorem 2, that ∀z ∈ Fk2 , ∀t > 0,
(⊗t−1
i=0 wH
)
(z) =(− 1
2
)t−1 (
wH(z) +
k
2
(
(−k)t−1 − 1)).
Z ⊕M1 ⊕M2 F1(M1) F2(M2)
ℓ0(Z ⊕M1 ⊕M2) ℓ1(F1(M1)) ℓ2(F2(M2))
(c)
Z ⊕M1 ⊕M2 M1 M2(b)
Z(a)
Fig. 1. Illustration of unintentional side-channel leakage, (a) without
protection, (b) with a 3-share additive Boolean masking, (c) with leakage
squeezing of order 2, using two bijections Fi : Fk2 → Fk2 (i ∈ {1, 2 = t−1}).
Then, as mentioned in the introduction, such a code is
better researched by looking at its dual. As proven later in
Theorem IV.2, the code C(F1, F2) has dual distance at least
d+ 1 if and only if the [3k, k] linear code
C(F1, F2)
⊥ = {(u,G1(u), G2(u))|u ∈ Fk2}
is 3-CIS and has minimum distance at least d + 1. In this
equation, G1 = (F ∗1 )
−1, G2 = (F ∗2 )
−1 where F ∗ denotes the
adjoint operator of F , that is, the operator whose matrix is the
transpose of that of F. Equivalently, F1 = (G−11 )
∗ = (G∗1)
−1
and F2 = (G−12 )
∗ = (G∗2)
−1.
This is where our CISness test algorithm comes into play.
The two functions F1 and F2 can be found in three steps,
detailed hereafter.
(i) The best known linear code [tk, k] is checked for CIS-
ness. We have found in Sec. VIII-A that the best known
linear code [24, 8, 8] is 3-CIS. So we know that masking
with second-order leakage squeezing allows to resist to
attacks of order 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. The first attack to
succeed is at order 8.
Note that in case the best known linear code had not
been CIS, we would been obliged to fall back on non-
optimal codes (that in turn are tested for CISness) until
a CIS code of parameters [tk, k] is found.
(ii) The code is written under systematic form as
{(u,G1(u), G2(u))|u ∈ Fk2}. Its generating matrix
writes as (I8 L1 L2), where:
L1 =

1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
,
L2 =

0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1

are two matrices of maximal rank k = 8.
(iii) Now, F1 and F2 are deduced from G1 and G2. Let us
denote by LT the transpose of the square k × k matrix
L. We get that F1 maps M1, seen as a column, to
5F1(M1) = (L
T
1 )
−1 ·M1, and that F1 maps M1, seen as
a column, to F2(M2) = (LT2 )
−1 ·M2. The two matrices
involved are given below:
(LT1 )
−1 =

0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
 ,
(LT2 )
−1 =

0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
 .
III. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
A. Binary codes
For basic definitions of codes, we refer to [14], [15], [22].
Let C be a binary linear code. Its parameters are formatted as
[n, k, d] denoting length, dimension, and minimum distance.
By an unrestricted code we shall mean a possibly nonlinear
code. The dual C⊥ of a linear code C is understood to be
with respect to the standard inner product.
A binary (unrestricted) code C of length n is called
systematic if there exists a subset I of {1, · · · , n} called
an information set of C, such that every possible tuple of
length |I| occurs in exactly one codeword within the specified
coordinates xi; i ∈ I . Every non trivial linear code is
systematic in this sense, since it admits a generator matrix
in which all the vectors of the canonical basis of Fk2 are
columns. The generator matrix of a [tk, k] code is said to be in
systematic form if these columns are at the first k positions,
that is, if it is blocked as (Ik|A) with Ik the identity matrix of
order k. We call a systematic code of length tk which admits t
pairwise disjoint information sets a t-CIS (unrestricted) code.
The Hamming weight wH(z) of a binary vector z is
the number of its nonzero entries. The Hamming distance
dH(x, y) of two binary vectors x, y is defined as the weight
of their sum dH(x, y) = wH(x+ y).
A binary code is said to be s-quasi-cyclic if it is wholly
invariant under T s where T stands for the shift operator and
the index s divides n. Such codes have a natural module
structure over the ring F2[x]/(xm − 1), where m = n/s. The
code is said to be 1-generator if it has a single generator as
such a module.
B. Boolean functions
A permutation F of Fk2 is any bijective map from Fk2 → Fk2 ,
also called a vectorial Boolean function. Let a, b ∈ Fk2 . The
Walsh-Hadamard transform of F at (a, b) is defined by
WF (a, b) =
∑
x∈Fk2
(−1)a·x+b·F (x),
where a · x denotes the usual scalar product of vectors a and
x.
If f is a Boolean function with domain Fk2 and range F2,
then the Fourier transform fˆ of f at a is defined by
fˆ(a) =
∑
x∈Fk2
f(x)(−1)a·x =
∑
x∈supp(f)
(−1)a·x,
where supp(f) is the support of function f .
Also if F1 is any permutation of Fk2 and b is in Fk2 , then
let f = b · F1 so that for x ∈ Fk2 , f(x) = b · F1(x), the usual
scalar product of b and F1(x) as valued in {0, 1}. Then the
Fourier transform of f at a is
fˆ(a) = b̂ · F1(a) =
∑
x∈Fk2 |b·F1(x)=1
(−1)a·x.
Considering b · F1(x) as valued in {0, 1} ⊂ Z, we
have (−1)b·F1(x) = 1 − 2(b · F1(x)). Then, we have
that the Walsh-Hadamard transform value WF1(a, b) =∑
x∈Fk2 (−1)
b·F1(x)+a·x equals
∑
x∈Fk2 (−1)
a·x − 2(b̂ · F1(a)).
If a = 0 then
∑
x∈Fk2 (−1)
a·x = 2k and otherwise∑
x∈Fk2 (−1)
a·x = 0. Hence for a 6= 0 we have that
WF1(a, b) =
∑
x∈Fk2 (−1)
b·F1(x)+a·x = −2(b̂ · F1(a)). There-
fore we see that for a 6= 0,
WF1(a, b) = 0 if and only if b̂ · F1(a) = 0. (1)
C. Dual distance
If C is a binary code of length n, let (Bi)i=0,...,n denote
its distance distribution, that is,
Bi =
1
|C| |{(x, y) ∈ C × C | dH(x, y) = i}| .
The dual distance distribution (B⊥i )i=0,...,n is the
MacWilliams transform of the distance distribution, in
the sense that
D⊥C (X,Y ) =
1
|C|DC(X + Y,X − Y ),
where
DC(X,Y ) =
n∑
i=0
BiX
n−iY i,
denotes the distance enumerator and
D⊥C (X,Y ) =
n∑
i=0
B⊥i X
n−iY i.
The dual distance of C is the smallest i > 0 such that B⊥i 6=
0. When C is linear, it is the minimum distance of C⊥, since
D⊥C (X,Y ) = DC⊥(X,Y ).
D. Z4-codes
Recall that the Gray map φ from Z4 to F22 is defined by
φ(0) = 00, φ(1) = 01, φ(2) = 11, φ(3) = 10.
This map is extended componentwisely from Zn4 to F2n2 ; It is
referred to as the binary image. A Z4-linear code of length n
is a Z4-submodule of Zn4 and is called a Z4-code for short. The
binary image φ(C) of a Z4-code C is just {φ(c)| c ∈ C}. In
general, a Z4-code C is of type 4k2l if C ∼= Zk4Zl2 as additive
groups. A Z4-code is called free if l = 0. The parameters
of a Z4-code are hereby formatted as (n, |C|, dL(C)), where
dL(C) denotes the minimum distance of the binary image of
C, called the Lee distance.
6IV. BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
A. Characterization of 3-CIS codes
For simplicity’s sake we will mainly consider the case t = 3.
A pair (F1, F2) of permutations of Fk2 forms a Correlation
Immune Pair (CIP) of strength d if and only if for every
(a, b, c) such that a, b, c ∈ Fk2 , a 6= 0, and wH(a) + wH(b) +
wH(c) ≤ d, we have b̂ · F1(a) = 0 or ĉ · F2(a) = 0,
equivalently WF1(a, b) = 0 or WF2(a, c) = 0 by Equation (1).
This notion has actually already been introduced in a
slightly different way in [1]. It expresses the fact that the
leakage squeezing with two masks (i.e., t = 3 shares) and two
permutations F1 and F2 allows to resist high-order attacks of
order d. We here give it the name of CIP of strength d.
The definition of a CIP of strength d is equivalent to
Condition (8) in [1], that we recall now:
∀a ∈ Fk2 , a 6= 0,∃q, r such that
wH (a) + q + r = d− 1,
∀b ∈ Fk2 , wH (b) ≤ q =⇒ b̂ · F1(a) = 0,
∀c ∈ Fk2 , wH (c) ≤ r =⇒ ĉ · F2(a) = 0.
The reason is as follows. For a given a 6= 0, we denote by
q1 the maximal number such that b̂ · F1(a) = 0 for every b
such that wH(b) ≤ q1 and by r1 the maximal number such
that ĉ · F2(a) = 0 for every c such that wH(c) ≤ r1. Then
there exists b such that wH(b) = q1 + 1 and b̂ · F1(a) 6= 0,
and there exists c such that wH(c) = r1+1 and ĉ · F2(a) 6= 0.
In Condition (8) recalled above, we necessarily have q ≤ q1
and r ≤ r1 (by the definition of q1 and r1).
If Condition (8) [1] is satisfied, we have that wH(a)+(q1+
1)+r1 = wH(a)+q1+(r1+1) ≥ wH(a)+q+r+1 = d, and
hence wH(a)+ q1+ r1 ≥ d− 1. This implies the condition in
the definition of CIP. This is because given (a, b, c) such that
a, b, c ∈ Fk2 , a 6= 0, and wH(a) + wH(b) + wH(c) ≤ d, we
have b̂ · F1(a) = 0 or ĉ · F2(a) = 0 since wH(a) + wH(b) +
wH(c) ≤ d implies wH(b) ≤ q1 (and b̂ · F1(a) = 0 ) or
wH(c) ≤ r1 (and ĉ · F2(a) = 0). Conversely, if Condition
(8) [1] is not satisfied then we have wH(a)+ q1+ r1 < d− 1
for some a 6= 0; then choosing b of weight q1 + 1 such that
b̂ · F1(a) 6= 0 and c of weight r1 + 1 such that ĉ · F2(a) 6= 0,
we see that the condition in the definition of a CIP of strength
d is not satisfied. This completes the proof of the equivalence
between a CIP of strength d and Condition (8) in [1].
We are now ready for the coding theoretic characterization
of CIP.
Theorem IV.1. If F1, F2 are permutations of Fk2 then they
form a CIP of strength d if and only if the systematic code of
length 3k and size 22k
C(F1, F2) = {(x+ y, F1(x), F2(y))|x, y ∈ Fk2} (2)
has dual distance at least d+ 1.
Proof.
Let C = C(F1, F2). To find the dual distance of C, we
recall
D⊥C (X,Y ) =
1
|C|DC(X + Y,X − Y ).
By the definition of DC(X,Y ), we first consider the distance
enumerator of this code:
DC(X,Y ) =
1
|C|
∑
x,y,x′,y′∈Fk2 [
X3k−dH(x+y,x
′+y′)−dH(F1(x),F1(x′))−dH(F2(y),F2(y′))
Y dH(x+y,x
′+y′)+dH(F1(x),F1(x′))+dH(F2(y),F2(y′))].
Note that for every x, y ∈ Fk2 , we have dH(x, y) = wH(x+
y), and that, for every u ∈ Fk2 , we have
(X + Y )k−wH(u)(X − Y )wH(u)
=
∑
a∈Fk2 X
k−wH(a)∏k
i=1((−1)uiY )ai
=
∑
a∈Fk2 (−1)
a·uXk−wH(a)Y wH(a).
Thus, combining it with the above description of DC(X,Y ),
we have
DC(X + Y,X − Y ) = 1|C|
∑
x,y,x′,y′,a,b,c∈Fk2 [
(−1)a·(x+x′+y+y′)+b·(F1(x)+F1(x′))+c·(F2(y)+F2(y′))
X3k−wH(a)−wH(b)−wH(c)Y wH(a)+wH(b)+wH(c)] =
1
|C|
∑
a,b,c∈Fk2 [(∑
x∈Fk2 (−1)
a·x+b·F1(x)
)2 (∑
y∈Fk2 (−1)
a·y+c·F2(y)
)2
X3k−wH(a)−wH(b)−wH(c)Y wH(a)+wH(b)+wH(c)].
Thus
DC(X + Y,X − Y ) = 1|C|
∑
a,b,c∈Fk2 [(WF1(a, b)WF2(a, c))
2
X3k−wH (a)−wH (b)−wH (c)Y wH (a)+wH (b)+wH (c)].
Hence, if F1 and F2 are permutations of Fk2 that form a CIP
of strength d, then we have WF1(a, b) = 0 or WF2(a, c) = 0
for every (a, b, c) such that a, b, c ∈ Fk2 , a 6= 0, and
wH(a) + wH(b) + wH(c) ≤ d. If a = 0 and (b, c) 6= (0, 0),
say if b 6= 0, then since F1 is a permutation, the coefficient of
X3k−wH(a)−wH(b)−wH(c)Y wH(a)+wH(b)+wH(c) is null as well.
This implies that the dual distance of the code C is at least
d+ 1.
Conversely if the dual distance of the code C is at least
d + 1, then the last equation implies that WF1(a, b) = 0 or
WF2(a, c) = 0 for every nonzero (a, b, c) such that a, b, c ∈
Fk2 , and wH(a) + wH(b) + wH(c) ≤ d. Therefore, the pair
(F1, F2) is a CIP of strength d.
In the case of linear permutations we get back to the
definition of a 3-CIS linear code. The following theorem was
proved in Section 3.6 of [1]. For self-completeness, we give
its proof.
Theorem IV.2. ([1, Sec. 3.6]) If F1, F2 are linear permuta-
tions of Fk2 , then they form a CIP of strength d if and only if
the [3k, k] linear code
C(F1, F2)
⊥ = {(u,G1(u), G2(u))|u ∈ Fk2}
is 3-CIS and has minimum distance at least d+ 1.
7Here G1 = (F ∗1 )
−1, G2 = (F ∗2 )
−1 where F ∗ denotes the
adjoint operator of F , that is, the operator whose matrix is
the transpose of that of F.
Proof. The code C(F1, F2) being the set of words (x +
y, F1(x), F2(y)), with x, y ∈ Fk2 , its dual C⊥ is the set of
words (u, v, w) such that
(x+y)·u+F1(x)·v+F2(y)·w = x·(u+F ∗1 (v))+y·(u+F ∗2 (w)) = 0
for every x, y ∈ Fk2 . Hence C⊥ is the set of words (u, v, w)
such that u = F ∗1 (v), u = F
∗
2 (w) so that v = (F
∗
1 )
−1(u) =
G1(u), w = (F
∗
2 )
−1(v) = G2(u). The result follows.
B. Definition of a correlation-immune t-uple (t-CI) and link
with a (t+ 1)-CIS code
More generally we make the following definition for t > 2.
The t-uple F1, · · · , Ft of permutations of Fk2 form a Cor-
relation Immune t-uple (t-CI) of strength d if and only if
for every (a0, · · · , at) such that a0 6= 0 and wH(a0) + · · ·+
wH(at) ≤ d, we have that
t∏
i=1
âi · Fi(a0) = 0.
A 2-CI was defined at the beginning of Section IV as a CIP.
Theorems IV.1 and IV.2 can also be demonstrated in the case
t > 2. As argued in Sec. II, this case is motivated, like the
case t = 2, by the leakage squeezing applied on a masking
scheme that involves t shares.
C. Bounds
The following bounds on d for a t-CIS [tk, k, d] code can
be derived immediately:
(i) d ≥ t : because of the partition in t information subsets,
(ii) d ≤ tk−k+1 = (t−1)k+1 : because of the Singleton
bound, but since only trivial MDS (maximum distance
separable) codes exist over F2, we have d ≤ (t − 1)k
for tk > 3.
Nonetheless, better bounds can be obtained:
Proposition IV.3. For large t, the largest minimum distance
d of a binary [kt, k, d] code satisfies to
(i) d ≥ kt ( 12 − C/√t+O ( 1t3/2 )), with C =√log(2)/2.
(ii) d ≤ kt2k−1/(2k − 1).
Proof. The lower bound follows by the asymptotic version of
the Varshamov Gilbert bound [22, p. 557] combined with the
expansion about x = 0 of the functional inverse of the entropy
function
H−1(1− x) = 0.5− C√x+O(x1.5).
The upper bound follows by the Plotkin bound [22, p. 42].
V. Z4-CODES AND NON-LINEAR BINARY CODES
Z4-codes of length n (i.e., Z4-submodules of Zn4 ) can be
useful in the context of masking (Sec. II) in that their binary
image can have a better minimum distance d (i.e., their formal
duals can have a better dual distance) than binary linear codes
of the same length and cardinality. It is also remarked in [1,
page 133] that non-linear binary codes (that is, non-linearity
of permutations F1 and F2) might still achieve better (in the
study of masking). Define a free Z4-code of length tk with 4k
codewords to be t-CIS if its coordinate set can be partitioned
into t disjoint information sets. The following theorem justifies
the study of t-CIS Z4-codes since the Gray images of these
codes generate systematic t-CIS binary (usually, non-linear)
codes.
Theorem V.1. Suppose that C is a t-CIS Z4-
code of length tk with 4k codewords so that
C = {(u,G1(u), · · · , Gt−1(u))|u ∈ Zk4}, where
G1, · · · , Gt−1 are (t − 1) permutations of Zk4 . Then its
binary image is a systematic t-CIS code of length 2tk, and of
cardinality 22k. Furthermore, if the minimum Lee distance of
C is d+1, then the (t−1) permutations Fi = φ◦(G∗i )−1◦φ−1
(with 1 ≤ i ≤ t− 1) of F2k2 form a (t− 1)-CI of strength d.
Proof. Follows from the properties of the dual distance of a
Z4-linear code.
Example V.2. For the case k = 8 and t = 2, it has already
been remarked in [25], [3] that the Nordstrom-Robinson code
has a better minimal distance (namely 6) than the best known
linear code (of parameters [16, 8, 5]). The derivation of the
optimal bijection F (referred to as F1 in this section) is
obtained in [25] by a manual partitioning of the codewords
coordinates. Now, Theorem V.1 gives a method to recover the
same result trivially by knowing that the Nordstrom-Robinson
code is the binary image of the octacode [10]. The generating
matrix for this code can be written under systematic form in
Z4, as
(I4 M) =

1 0 0 0 3 1 2 1
0 1 0 0 1 2 3 1
0 0 1 0 3 3 3 2
0 0 0 1 2 3 1 1

and thus the researched bijection for leakage squeezing is
F (x) = φ
((
φ−1(x)
) (
MT
)−1)
. In this equation, x ∈ F82,
φ−1(x) is a vector (seen as a 1 × 4 matrix) of Z44, and
φ : Z44 → F82 is the componentwise Gray map.
Remark V.3. It is stated as an open problem in [1] whether
for the cases k ∈ {4, 8} and t = 3 there are better solutions
than linear bijections F1 and F2. Theorem V.1 allows to show
that Z4-linear codes are not better. Indeed, the best Z4-linear
code of parameters (6, 42, 6) has minimal distance 6; thus, by
Theorem V.1, it not better than the best binary linear code of
parameters [24, 8, 8] (presented in great details in Sec. II-B).
Similarly, the best Z4-linear code of parameters (12, 44, 8) has
minimal distance 8; thus, by Theorem V.1, it not better than
the best binary linear code of parameters [24, 8, 8].
8Example V.4. In a recent computer search, a Z4-code with
the parameters (24, 46, 18) was found [16]. Its binary image
has the parameters (48, 212, 18), while the best known linear
[48, 12] code has only the minimum distance 17. The Z4-code
admits a partition of the positions into 4 disjoint information
sets. In the following generator matrix, this partition is given
by consecutive blocks of 6 positions.
100000 023213 301011 132301
010000 231330 013120 303121
001000 231123 003312 001012
000100 321233 222323 132032
000010 322333 330001 321033
000001 321301 313202 122120

It can be checked by using the software of [9] that this
code is 8-quasi-cyclic over Z4 and that its permutation group
is of order 3. Being 8-quasi-cyclic over Z4 in length 24 it can
therefore be constructed by the cubic construction of [20], that
is, be decomposed into a pair (C1, C2), where C1 is a code
over Z4 of length 8 and C2 is a code of length 8 over the
Galois ring GR(4, 2).
Example V.5. We denote the Kerdock Z4-code [13] of length
2k, whose image by the Gray map is the (Z4-linear) Kerdock
code of length 2k+1, by Kk+1 (k odd). Its parameters are
(2k, 4k+1, 2k − 2(k−1)/2). Shortening and then puncturing the
code K5+1 yields a Z4-code with the parameters (30, 45, 26),
while the best known linear [60, 10] code has only the mini-
mum distance 25. Since the automorphism group acts doubly
transitive on the positions of Kk+1, this derivation from K5+1
is unique up to isomorphism. We checked computationally that
it admits a partition of the position into 6 disjoint information
sets. Hence K5+1 is a 6-CIS Z4-code.
Example V.6. The (128, 48, 120) Z4-code K7+1 admits a
partition of the positions into 16 disjoint information sets.
Hence K7+1 is a 16-CIS Z4-code. The best known linear
[256, 16] linear code is a [256, 16, 113] code.
Example V.7. Shortening and then puncturing the code K7+1
yields a Z4-code K7+1,a with the parameters (126, 47, 118).
This derivation is unique up to isomorphism. It admits a
partition of the positions into 18 disjoint information sets.
Hence K7+1,a is a 18-CIS Z4-code. The best known linear
[252, 14] code has only the minimum distance 113.
Example V.8. Shortening K7+1 at any two positions, we get a
Z4-code K7+1,b with the parameters (126, 46, 120). Again, this
derivation is unique up to isomorphism. It admits a partition of
the positions into 21 disjoint information sets. Hence K7+1,b
is a 21-CIS Z4-code. The best known linear [252, 12]-code has
only the minimum distance 118.
VI. ASYMPTOTICS
Denote by H(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) the binary
entropy function [22, p.308]. In this section we show that
there are long 3-CIS codes satisfying the Gilbert-Varshamov
bound for rate 1/3 codes, that is with relative distance at least
H−1(1/3). We begin with a well-known fact [22, p.399].
Lemma VI.1. The number of invertible k × k matrices is
∼ c2k2 , with c ≈ 0.29.
Denote by B(k, d) the number of pairs of permutations
F1, F2 such that d columns or less of the generator matrix of
C(F1, F2) (notation of Equation (2) of the preceding section)
are linearly dependent. A crude upper bound on this function
can be derived as follows.
Lemma VI.2. The quantity B(k, d) is ≤M(k, d) where
M(k, d) =
d∑
j=2
∑
1≤r+s≤j
(
k
j − r − s
)(
k
r
)(
k
s
)
(r+s)2k(2k−2).
Proof. The set of columns of the said matrix is naturally
partitioned in three parts of size k each, the three information
sets of the 3-CIS property. Let j be the size of the linearly
dependent family of column vectors of the said matrix with
j − r− s columns in part I, r in part II, s in part III. Choose
two columns amongst r+s to be obtained as the sum of j−1
others. Neglecting the invertibility properties we have 2k − 2
columns to choose freely in parts II and III.
Lemma VI.3. The quantity M(k, d) is dominated by
22k
2−2k23kH(δ) when d ∼ 3δk with 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1/2.
Proof. We evaluate the inner sum in M(k, d) by the Chu-
Vandermonde identity(
3k
j
)
=
∑
0≤r,s,≤j
(
k
j − r − s
)(
k
r
)(
k
s
)
.
Then, the outer sum
d∑
j=0
(
3k
j
)
is evaluated by standard entropic estimates for binomials [22,
p.310]. Note that r + s ≤ 2k, a sub-exponential quantity.
We are now in position to derive the main result of this
section.
Proposition VI.4. For each δ such that H(δ) < 1/3 there are
long 3-CIS codes of relative distance δ.
Proof. Combine Lemmas VI.1, VI.2, VI.3 to ensure that,
asymptotically, |GL(k, 2)|2  B(k, d) showing the existence
of a 3-CIS code of distance > d, for k large enough.
VII. t-CIS PARTITION ALGORITHM
For an introduction to matroid theory, we refer the reader
to [8], [29], [35]. The notion of a matroid describes an
independence system based upon sets. A matroid is a pair
(M, I) such that M is a finite set and I is a collection of
subsets of M (called independent sets) where I is nonempty,
any subset of a set in I is also in I , and all maximum
independent subsets contained in A ⊆ M have the same
size. This maximum independent set size within A ⊆ M
is the rank of A. Additionally, the span of A is the set
span(A) = {c ∈M |rank(A) = rank({c}∪A)}. This definition
of span is equivalent to the definition of closure in [35].
In 1964, Edmonds gave the following result regarding the
partition of a matroid [8].
9Theorem VII.1. The elements of a matroid M can be parti-
tioned into as few as t independent sets if and only if there is
no subset S of elements of M such that |S| > t · rank(S).
Example VII.2. If M is the matroid on the columns of a
matrix A over a field F, induced by linear dependence, then
rank(S) is simply the usual F -rank of S in the linear algebra
sense. In the present application, we take F = F2 and A the
k by n generator matrix of the code tested for CISness.
Proposition VII.3. State-of-the-art algorithms (such as [1,
Appendix A] and [11, Section VII]) that test for all potential
partitions into k information sets of the coordinate set are of
exponential complexity.
Proof. The state-of-the-art algorithms to test CISness are of
complexity
t∏
τ=2
(
τk
k
)
=
(tk)!
k!t
=
n!
(nt !)
t
, where n = tk .
Using Stirling’s approximation ln(n!) = n lnn−n+O(lnn),
we find that the logarithm of the complexity is n lnn − n −
n ln(n/t)+n+O(lnn) = n ln t+O(lnn). Thus an exponential
complexity in tn.
The paper [8] sketches a polynomial time algorithm for
obtaining the partition described in Theorem VII.1. A more
precise execution time estimate is O(n3) [18]. Thus this
algorithm based on matroid theory has an improved execution
time compared state-of-the-art algorithms (see Prop. VII.3).
Adapted from the theory in [8], we obtain the following
algorithm which given any linear [tk, k] code determines
whether it is t-CIS. If it is t-CIS, then a partition of the
columns is output. If it is not, then a set S of the columns of
the generator matrix violating Theorem VII.1 is output. In the
algorithm we will routinely use the following terms. Given a
[tk, k] code C with generator matrix G, the set M will denote
the column indices (the integers from 1 to tk). We will say
the subset I of M is independent (resp. dependent) if the
corresponding columns are independent (resp. dependent).
Similarly, we will denote the rank(I) and span(I) with
respect to the corresponding columns. In particular, span(I)
denotes the subset of indices in M that are spanned by the
subset I .
t-CIS Partition Algorithm: An algorithm to determine if a
given linear code is t-CIS.
Input: Begin with a binary [tk, k] code C.
Output: An answer of “Yes” if C is t-CIS (along with a column
partition) and an answer of “No” if not (along with a set of
columns violating Edmonds’ Theorem).
(i) Let {I1, . . . , It} be a set of labeled disjoint independent
subsets of M . (Note that each Ii (1 ≤ i ≤ t) can be
randomly assigned to each have order 1, or one may be
given the first k indices of a standard form matrix G.)
(ii) Select x ∈M \⋃1≤i≤t Ii.
(iii) While
⋃
1≤i≤t Ii (M do:
a) Initialize S0 := M . For j > 0, recursively define
Sj := span(Ij′ ∩ Sj−1), where j′ = ((j −
1) mod t) + 1. The modulus is necessary for the
indices of the independent sets. Initialize j := 0.
b) For the current value of j check that |Sj | ≤
t · rank(Sj). If the inequality is false (it is imme-
diately clear that Theorem VII.1 is violated), then
exit the while loop and output the set Sj with an
answer of “No.”
c) If x ∈ Sj , then set j := j + 1 and go back to b).
d) If x /∈ Sj , then check if Ij′ ∪ {x} is independent.
If so then replace Ij′ with the larger independent
set and repeat the while loop with a new x ∈M \⋃
1≤i≤t Ii.
e) If Ij′∪{x} is dependent, then find the unique mini-
mal dependent set C ⊂ Ij′∪{x} (accomplished by
solving the matrix equation associated with finding
the linear combination of columns in Ij′ that sum
to x).
f) Select any x′ ∈ C \ Sj−1 and replace Ij′ with
Ij′ ∪ {x} \ {x′}, then set x := x′ and repeat the
while loop.
(iv) End while loop. If the while loop was not exited early,
then output the partition {I1, . . . , It} of M and answer
“Yes.”
VIII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The command BKLC(GF (2), n, k) from the computer
package Magma [26] means the best known binary linear [n, k]
code as per [12]. The table captions are as follows.
• bk= obtained by the command BKLC(GF (2), n, k)
from Magma.
• bk*= same as bk with successive zero columns of the
generator matrix replaced in order by successive columns
of the identity matrix of order k. Trivially the generator
matrix of bk has < k zero columns.
• qc= quasi-cyclic.
A. 3-CIS codes
The following tables show that all 3-CIS codes of dimension
3 to 85 have the best known minimum distance among all
linear [n, k] codes, and in fact the best possible minimum
distance for n ≤ 36. We have checked that the best known
linear [132, 44, 32] code in the Magma database [26] is not
3-CIS.
n 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39
k 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
d 4 4 6 7 8 8 8 10 11 12 12 12
code qc qc bk bk bk bk* bk* bk bk bk bk* bk*
n 42 45 48 51 54 57 60 63 66 69 72 75
k 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
d 13 14 15 16 16 16 17 17 18 18 20 20
code bk bk bk bk bk* bk* bk bk bk bk bk* bk
n 78 81 84 87 90 93 96 99 102 105 108 111 114 117 120
k 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
d 20 22 22 24 24 24 24 24 24 26 26 26 27 28 28
code bk* bk bk* bk bk* bk* bk bk bk bk bk* bk bk bk bk
n 123 126 129 132 135 138 141 144 147 150 153 156 159 162
k 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54
d 29 31 32 ? 32 32 32 32 34 34 33 34 34 35
code bk* bk* bk* ? bk* bk* bk* bk* bk bk* bk bk* bk* bk
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n 165 168 171 174 177 180 183 186 189 192 195 198 201 204
k 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
d 36 36 36 36 36 38 38 38 40 41 42 42 42 41
code bk* bk* bk* bk* bk* bk bk* bk* bk bk bk bk* bk* bk
n 207 210 213 216 219 222 225 228 231 234 237 240 243 246
k 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82
d 43 44 44 44 45 47 48 47 46 48 48 48 49 51
code bk bk bk* bk* bk bk bk* bk bk* bk bk* bk* bk bk
n 249 252 255
k 83 84 85
d 52 53 54
code bk* bk bk*
B. 4-CIS codes
For 1 ≤ k ≤ b256/tc except for k = 37, we have checked
that there are 4-CIS [tk, k] codes that are either bk or bk∗. We
have checked that the best known linear [148, 37, 41] code in
the Magma database [26] is not 4-CIS. See the below tables.
n 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72
k 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
d 5 6 8 9 10 12 13 14 16 16 17 19 20 21 24 24 24
code bk bk* bk* bk bk* bk bk bk bk bk* bk bk bk* bk bk* bk* bk
n 76 80 84 88 92 96 100 104 108 112 116 120 124 128 132 136 140
k 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
d 24 25 27 28 28 28 31 32 32 32 34 34 36 36 37 38 40
code bk bk bk bk bk bk bk bk bk* bk* bk bk bk* bk* bk bk bk*
n 144 148 152 156 160 164 168 172 176 180 184 188 192 196
k 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49
d 42 ? 40 42 44 44 44 45 46 46 48 48 50 50
code bk ? bk* bk bk bk* bk* bk bk bk* bk bk bk* bk
n 200 204 208 212 216 220 224 228 232 236 240 244 248 252 256
k 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64
d 50 52 52 54 52 54 55 57 60 60 58 60 62 62 64
code bk* bk bk* bk* bk* bk* bk bk bk bk* bk* bk bk* bk* bk*
C. t-CIS codes with 5 ≤ t ≤ 256
For 5 ≤ t ≤ 256 and 1 ≤ k ≤ b256/tc, all the best known
codes in the Magma database have been checked. We conclude
that there are t-CIS [tk, k] codes that are either bk or bk∗.
IX. CONSTRUCTION METHODS
For background on quasi-cyclic codes we refer the reader
to [19], [20], [21]. In what follows, we give efficient ways to
construct t-CIS codes in the sense that we can generate many
t-CIS codes quickly and hence we easily get t-CIS codes with
high minimum distances from them.
Proposition IX.1 (quasi-cyclic codes). Let C be a quasi-cyclic
[tk, k] code of co-index k. Assume that C is a 1-generator
quasi-cyclic code with generating row
(a1, a2, · · · , at),
where ai ∈ F2[x] are polynomials coprime with xk − 1.
Then C is a t-CIS code.
Proof. The determinant of a circulant matrix of attached poly-
nomial a(x) is zero if and only if deg(gcd(a(x), xk+1)) > 0.
The result follows.
Example IX.2. The best known linear code [243, 9, 118] is a
1-generator quasi-cyclic code with generating row in octal
[175, 177, 63, 357, 257, 253, 25, 73, 267, 113, 135, 377, 123,
337, 75, 37, 273, 51, 155, 153, 45, 35, 5, 65, 127, 133, 147].
The polynomials in x corresponding to these 27 numbers can
be shown to be all coprime with x27 − 1.
The following constructions are a natural extension of those
in [3], [17].
Lemma IX.3 (Subtracting construction). Suppose that C is a
t-CIS [tk, k] code with generator matrix G = (A1 A2 · · ·At),
where each Aj (1 ≤ j ≤ t) is an invertible k×k matrix. Then,
there exists a t-CIS [(k−1)t, k−1] code with generator matrix
G′ = (A′1 A
′
2 · · ·A′t), where each A′j (1 ≤ j ≤ t) is a
(k − 1)× (k − 1) invertible matrix.
Proof. Choose any i (1 ≤ i ≤ k). Delete the ith row of G.
Then each Aj (1 ≤ j ≤ t) becomes a (k−1)×k matrix whose
rank is k−1. For each j (1 ≤ j ≤ t), there exists a column of
Aj which is a linear combination of the rest columns of Aj .
Delete the column of Aj to get A′j , which is invertible since
rank(A′j) = k − 1.
Proposition IX.4 (Building up construction). Suppose that
C is a t-CIS [tk, k] code C with generator matrix G =
(A1 A2 · · ·At), where each Aj (1 ≤ j ≤ t) is an invertible
k × k matrix. Let Aj(ri) (1 ≤ i ≤ k) denote the ith row of
the matrix Aj . Then for any vectors xj ∈ Fn2 (1 ≤ j ≤ t) and
yij ∈ F2 (1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ t), the following matrix G1
generates a t-CIS [t(k + 1), k + 1] code C1.
G1 =

z1 x1 z2 x2 · · · zt xt
y11 A1(r1) y12 A2(r1) · · · y1t At(r1)
y21 A1(r2) y22 A2(r2) · · · y2t At(r2)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
yk1 A1(rk) yk2 A2(rk) · · · ykt At(rk)

(3)
where for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ t), xj satisfies xj =∑k
i=1 cijAj(ri) for uniquely determined cij’s (cij = 0, 1) and
zj satisfies zj = 1 +
∑k
i=1 cijyij .
Proof. It is shown [3] that the (k + 1)× (k + 1) matrix with
the rows
z1|x1, y11|A1(r1), y21|A1(r2), . . . , yk1|A1(rk)
is invertible. By the same argument, we see that for any 1 ≤
j ≤ t, the (k + 1)× (k + 1) matrix with the rows
zj |x1, y1j |Aj(r1), y2j |Aj(r2), . . . , ykj |Aj(rk)
is invertible. Therefore, G1 is a [t(k + 1), k + 1] t-CIS code.
Proposition IX.5. Let C be a t-CIS [tk, k] code C. Then it
is equivalent to a t-CIS [tk, k] code C1 which is constructed
from a t-CIS [t(k− 1), k− 1] code by using Proposition IX.4.
Proof. The key idea of this proof is given in the proof of
Proposition VI.6 [3]. Basically, the subtracting construction
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(Lemma IX.3) and the building up construction (Proposi-
tion IX.4) are reversible operations.
Similar to the mass formula for 2-CIS codes given in Prop.
VI. 9 in [3], there exists a formula for determining if a list of
t-CIS codes is complete.
Proposition IX.6. For positive integers k and t ≥ 2, let
C denote the set of all t-CIS [tk, k] codes and let Stk
the symmetric group of degree tk act on the columns of
elements of C. Suppose C1, . . . , Cs are representatives from
each equivalence class in C under the action of Stk. Let Csys
denote the set of all t-CIS [tk, k] codes with generator matrix
in the form (Ik|A1| · · · |At−1) with all Aj ∈ GL(k, 2). Assume
each Ci is in Csys. Then
gk
t−1 =
s∑
i=1
|OrbStk(Ci) ∩Csys| (4)
in which OrbStk denotes the orbit of Ci under Stk and gk
denotes the cardinality of GL(k, 2). Hence we omit the details.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is just the repetition of
the argument in the proof of [3, Prop. VI.7].
Example IX.7.
Let C be a [3, 1, 3] repetition code with generator matrix
(1 1 1), which is 3-CIS. Choose x1 = (0),x2 = (1),x3 =
(0), y11 = 0, y12 = 0, and y13 = 1. Then z1 = 1, z2 = 1 and
z3 = 1 by Proposition IX.4. Hence the following matrix
G1 =
(
1 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 1
)
generates a [6, 2, 4] 3-CIS code.
X. ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF t-CIS CODES
In this section, we describe two methods of classification
for t-CIS codes relating to the equivalence classes of matrices
under defined equivalence relations.
A. Classification Methods Using Equivalence Classes of Ma-
trices
The two methods we propose here are based on the classifi-
cation method given in [11]. For the first method we consider
the following notion of equivalence on GL(k, 2): two matrices
A,B ∈ GL(k, 2) are equivalent, A ∼1 B, if and only if
A = BP where P is a k × k permutation matrix. Let
[GL(k, 2)]t−1 denote the set of all k×k(t−1) concatenations
of t − 1 elements from GL(k, 2). For the second method
we consider a notion of equivalence on [GL(k, 2)]t−1: two
matrices A,B ∈ [GL(k, 2)]t−1 are equivalent, A ∼2 B, if
and only if A = PkBPk(t−1) where Pk is a k×k permutation
matrix and Pk(t−1) is a k(t−1)×k(t−1) permutation matrix.
Note that the method applied in [11] is the case where t = 2.
Remark X.1. ∼1 and ∼2 are equivalence relations.
Proposition X.2. (Method 1) Given a set St−1 of all repre-
sentatives of inequivalent (t − 1)-CIS codes of dimension k
a set of all inequivalent t-CIS codes, St, of dimension k is
obtained by
(i) Appending a matrix representative of each equivalence
class under ∼1 to each code to obtain a set St of t-CIS
codes.
(ii) Carrying out an equivalence check on St to eliminate
equivalent codes, then keeping only one representative
from each class we obtain St.
Proposition X.3. (Method 2) Given a set Catk,t−1 of all
representatives of inequivalent (under ∼2) k by k(t − 1)
matrices in [GL(k, 2)]t−1 a set of all inequivalent t-CIS codes,
St, of dimension k is obtained by
(i) Appending a matrix representative in Catk,t−1 to the
identity matrix Ik to form a set St of t-CIS codes.
(ii) Carrying out an equivalence check on St to eliminate
equivalent codes, then keeping only one representative
from each class we obtain St.
Previously in [11], the cardinality of Catk,t−1 is given for
t = 2 and k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. In the following proposition
we extend to some results for t = 3. The values are found
using graph isomorphism and all code equivalences are also
checked using graph isomorphism as described in [11]. All
classifications were implemented in Magma [26].
Proposition X.4. The cardinality of Catk,t−1 for t = 3 and
k = 1, 2, 3, 4 is given in the following table:
k 1 2 3 4
Total 1 4 58 4822
In the following we use the methods described above to
obtain a classification of 3-CIS codes for k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
B. Classification of short t-CIS codes
Remark X.5. We note that any t-CIS code has minimum
distance ≥ t. If not then there exists at least one information
set which has an all zero row in the corresponding column
submatrix (this is a contradiction since the rank of the subma-
trix must be full).
The following table gives a summary of the classification.
This classification was obtained using the methods 1 and 2
described above. The ith column (i = 2–5) gives the number
of 3-CIS codes with d = i + 1, and in the parenthesis are
the number of which are self-orthogonal and then not self-
orthogonal. The final column gives a sum total of 3-CIS codes
corresponding to the length in column 1.
3k d = 3 d = 4 d = 5 d = 6 d = 7 Total #
3 1(0 + 1) 1
6 2(0 + 2) 1(1 + 0) 3
9 11(0 + 11) 8(1 + 7) 19
12 170(0 + 170) 178(6 + 172) 12(0 + 12) 1(0 + 1) 361
15 10904 15842 2543 91 1 29372
(0 + 10904) (15 + 15827) (0 + 2543) (1 + 90) (0 + 1)
We summarize our classification as follows.
Theorem X.6. For each 3k ∈ {3, 6, 12, 15}, there is a unique
optimal 3-CIS code of length 3k. There are eight optimal 3-
CIS [9, 3, 4] codes.
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XI. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this paper we have introduced and studied t-CIS codes for
t > 2. The main tool is an algorithm for CISness testing based
on the Edmonds base partitioning algorithm from matroid
theory. Combining this algorithm with the BKLC function of
Magma [26], which itself is based on Grassl’s tables [12], we
were able to show that for each t and k such that 3 ≤ t ≤ 256
and 1 ≤ k ≤ b256/tc except two cases, there are t-CIS
codes of dimension k that are optimal or with best known
parameters. The only open pairs of parameters where this
approach fails so far are t = 3 with k = 44 and t = 4 with
k = 37. The approaches of [3] have also been visited in turn.
The Z4-codes have been used successfully to create Boolean
functions with better correlation immunity than linear ones.
A recently discovered Z4-code of parameters (24, 46, 18) has
been applied. It would be interesting to know if it can be
completed into an infinite family. In the asymptotic domain,
the existence of long 3-CIS codes that are good has been
proved. It remains to be seen if there are families of good
long binary codes of rate 1/t that are not t-CIS. Are almost
all codes of rate 1/t t-CIS on average? We do not know the
answer to this question.
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